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Abstract
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good,
while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do
not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as Walrasian envy-free pricing
do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets.
When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this mechanism are small
constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for welfare the approximation
converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also give an impossibility theorem,
showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources, and in particular, is incompatible with
(Pareto) efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are procedures for allocating goods that have been studied in economics in the 20th
century, and which are even more relevant now due to the emergence of online platforms.
Major companies such as Google and Facebook make most of their revenue through auctions,
while an increasing number of governments around the world use spectrum auctions to
allocate licenses for electromagnetic spectrum to companies. These transactions involve
hundreds or thousands of participants with complex preferences, reason for which auctions
require more careful design and their study has resurfaced in the computer science literature.
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In this paper we study a paradigmatic model known as multi-unit auctions with budgets,
in which a seller brings multiple units of a good (e.g. apples), while the buyers bring money
and have interests in consuming the goods. Multi-unit auctions have been studied in a large
body of literature due to the importance of the model, which already illustrates complex
phenomena [16, 6, 18, 17, 19].
The main requirements from a good auction mechanism are usually computational
efficiency, revenue maximization for the seller, and simplicity of use for the participants, the
latter of which is captured through the notion of truthfulness. An important property that is
often missing from auction design is fairness, and in fact for the purpose of maximizing revenue
it is useful to impose higher payments to the buyers that are more interested in the goods.
However, there are studies showing that customers are unhappy with such discriminatory
prices (see, e.g., [1]), which has lead to a body of literature focused on achieving fair pricing
[25, 22, 14, 23, 38].
A remarkable solution concept that has been used for achieving fairness in auctions
comes from free markets, which are economic systems where the prices and allocations
are not designed by a central authority. Instead, the prices emerge through a process of
adjusting demand and supply such that everyone faces the same prices and the buyers freely
purchase the bundles they are most interested in. When the goods are divisible, an outcome
where supply and demand are perfectly balanced – known as competitive (or Walrasian)
equilibrium [39] – always exists under mild assumptions on the utilities and has the property
that the participants face the same prices and can freely acquire their favorite bundle at those
prices. The competitive equilibrium models outcomes of large economies, where the goods
are divisible and the participants so small (infinitesimal) that they have no influence on the
market beyond purchasing their most preferred bundle at the current prices. Unfortunately,
when the goods are indivisible, the competitive equilibrium does not necessarily exist (except
for small classes of valuations see, e.g., [30, 24]) and the induced mechanism – the Walrasian
mechanism [3, 13] – is generally manipulable.
A solution for recovering the attractive properties of the Walrasian equilibrium in the
multi-unit model is to relax the clearing requirement of the market equilibrium, by allowing
the seller to not sell all of the units. This solution is known as (Walrasian) envy-free pricing
[25], and it ensures that all the participants of the market face the same prices1, and each
one purchases their favorite bundle of goods. An envy-free pricing trivially exists by pricing
the goods infinitely high, so the challenge is finding one with good guarantees, such as high
revenue for the seller or high welfare for the participants.
We would like to obtain envy-free pricing mechanisms that work well with strategic
participants, who may alter their inputs to the mechanism to get better outcomes. To this
end, we design an optimal truthful and envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with
budgets, with high revenue and welfare in competitive environments. Our work can be
viewed as part of a general research agenda of simplicity in mechanism design [27], which
recently proposed item pricing [4, 23] as a way of designing simpler auctions while at the
same time avoiding the ill effects of discriminatory pricing [22, 1]. Item pricing is used in
practice all over the world to sell goods in supermarkets or online platforms such as Amazon,
which provides a strong motivation for understanding it theoretically. Other recent notions
of simplicity in mechanism design include the menu-size complexity [26], the competition
complexity [20], and verifiability of mechanisms (e.g. that the participants can easily convince
themselves that the mechanism has a property, such as being truthful [9, 31]).
1 The term envy-free pricing has also been used when the pricing is per-bundle, not per-item. We adopt
the original definition of [25] which applies to unit-pricing, due to its attractive fairness properties [22].
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1.1 Our Results
Our model is a multi-unit auction with budgets, in which a seller owns m identical units of
an item. Each buyer i has a budget Bi and a value vi per unit. The utilities of the buyers are
quasi-linear up to the budget cap, while any allocation that exceeds that cap is unfeasible.
We deal with the problem of designing envy-free pricing schemes for the strongest concept
of incentive compatibility, namely dominant strategy truthfulness. The truthful mechanisms
are in the prior-free setting, i.e. they do not require any prior distribution assumptions. We
evaluate the efficiency of mechanisms using the notion of market share, s∗, which captures
the maximum buying power of any individual buyer in the market. A market share of at
most 50% roughly means that no buyer can purchase more than half of the resources when
competition is maximal, i.e. at the minimum envy-free price. Our main theorem can be
summarized as follows.
I Theorem 1 (Main Theorem (informal)). For linear multi-unit auctions with known monetary
endowments:
There exists no (Walrasian) envy-free mechanism that is both truthful and non-wasteful.





of the optimal revenue and at least 1− s∗ of the optimal welfare on any
market, where 0 < s∗ < 1 is the market share. This mechanism is optimal for both the
revenue and welfare objectives when the market is even mildly competitive (i.e. with
market share s∗ ≤ 50%), and its approximation for welfare converges to 1 as the market
becomes fully competitive.
In the statement above, optimal means that there is no other truthful envy-free auction
mechanism with a better approximation ratio. A mechanism is non-wasteful if it allocates
as many units as possible at a given price. The impossibility theorem implies in particular
that truthfulness is incompatible with Pareto efficiency. Our positive results are for known
budgets, similarly to [16]. In the economics literature budgets are viewed as hard information
(quantitative), as opposed to the valuations, which represent soft information and are more
difficult to verify (see, e.g., [37]).
1.2 Related Work
The multi-unit setting has been studied in a large body of literature on auctions ([16, 6, 18,
17, 19]), where the focus has been on designing truthful auctions with good approximations
to some desired objective, such as the social welfare or the revenue. Quite relevant to ours
is the paper by [16], in which the authors study multi-unit auctions with budgets, however
with no restriction to envy-free pricing or even item-pricing. They design a truthful auction
(that uses discriminatory pricing) for known budgets, that achieves near-optimal revenue
guarantees when the influence of each buyer in the auction is bounded, using a notion of
buyer dominance, which is conceptually close to the market share notion that we employ.
Their mechanism is based on the concept of clinching auctions [2].
Attempts at good prior-free truthful mechanisms for multi-unit auctions are seemingly
impaired by their general impossibility result which states that truthfulness and efficiency
are essentially incompatible when the budgets are private. Our general impossibility result
is very similar in nature, but it is not implied by the results in [16] for the following two
reasons: (a) our impossibility holds for known budgets and (b) our notion of efficiency is
weaker, as it is naturally defined with respect to envy-free allocations only. This also means
that our impossibility theorem is not implied by their uniqueness result, even for two buyers.
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Multi-unit auctions with budgets have also been considered in [17] and [6], and without
budgets ([19, 5, 18]); all of the aforementioned papers do not consider the envy-freeness
constraint.
The effects of strategizing in markets have been studied extensively over the past few
years ([7, 8, 12, 33, 34]). For more general envy-free auctions, besides the multi-unit case,
there has been some work on truthful mechanisms in the literature of envy-free auctions
([25]) and ([28]) for pair envy-freeness, a different notion which dictates that no buyer would
want to swap its allocation with that of any other buyer [32]. It is worth noticing that there
is a body of literature that considers envy-free pricing as a purely optimization problem
(with no regard to incentives) and provides approximation algorithms and hardness results
for maximizing revenue and welfare in different auction settings [22, 15].
It is worth mentioning that the good approximations achieved by our truthful mechanism
are a prior-free setting ([29]), i.e. we don’t require any assumptions on prior distributions from
which the input valuations are drawn. Good prior-free approximations are usually much harder
to achieve and a large part of the literature is concerned with auctions under distributional
assumptions, under the umbrella of Bayesian mechanism design ([10, 11, 29, 35]).
2 Preliminaries
In a linear multi-unit auction with budgets there is a set of buyers, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n},
and a single seller with m indivisible units of a good for sale. Each buyer i has a valuation
vi > 0 and a budget Bi > 0, both drawn from a discrete domain V of rational numbers:
vi, Bi ∈ V. The valuation vi indicates the value of the buyer for one unit of the good.
An allocation is an assignment of units to the buyers denoted by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ Zn+, where xi is the number of units received by buyer i. We are interested in feasible
allocations, for which:
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ m.
The seller will set a price p per unit, such that the price of purchasing ` units is p · ` for
any buyer. The interests of the buyers at a given price are captured by the demand function.
I Definition 2 (Demand). The demand of buyer i at a price p is a set consisting of all the
possible bundle sizes (number of units) that the buyer would like to purchase at this price:
Di(p) =

min{bBip c,m}, if p < vi
0, . . . ,min{bBip c,m}, if p = vi
0, otherwise.
If a buyer is indifferent between buying and not buying at a price, then its demand is a
set of all the possible bundles that it can afford, based on its budget constraint.
I Definition 3 (Utility). The utility of buyer i given a price p and an allocation x is
ui(p, xi) =
{
vi · xi − p · xi, if p · xi ≤ Bi
−∞, otherwise
(Walrasian) Envy-free Pricing. An allocation and price (x, p) represent a (Walrasian)
envy-free pricing if each buyer is allocated a number of units in its demand set at price p, i.e.
xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N . A price p is an envy-free price if there exists an allocation x such
that (x, p) is an envy-free pricing.
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While an envy-free pricing always exists (just set p =∞), it is not always possible to sell
all the units in an envy-free way. We illustrate this through an example.
I Example 4 (Non-existence of envy-free clearing prices). Let N = {1, 2}, m = 3, valuations
v1 = v2 = 1.1, and B1 = B2 = 1. At any price p > 0.5, no more than 2 units can be sold in
total because of budget constraints. At p ≤ 0.5, both buyers are interested and demand at
least 2 units each, but there are only 3 units in total.
Objectives. We are interested in maximizing the social welfare and revenue objectives
attained at envy-free pricing. The social welfare at an envy-free pricing (x, p) is the total
value of the buyers for the goods allocated, while the revenue is the total payment received
by the seller, i.e. SW(x, p) =
∑n
i=1 vi · xi and REV(x, p) =
∑n
i=1 xi · p.
Mechanisms. The goal of the seller will be to obtain money in exchange for the goods,
however, it can only do that if the buyers are interested in purchasing them. The problem of
the seller will be to obtain accurate information about the preferences of the buyers that
would allow optimizing the pricing. Since the inputs (valuations) of the buyers are private,
we will aim to design auction mechanisms that incentivize the buyers to reveal their true
preferences [36].
An auction mechanism is a function M : Vn → O×Zn+ that maps the valuations reported
by the buyers to a price p ∈ O, where O is the space from which the prices are drawn2, and
an allocation vector x ∈ Zn+.
I Definition 5 (Truthful Mechanism). A mechanism M is truthful if it incentivizes the buyers
to reveal their true inputs, i.e. ui(M(v)) ≥ ui(M(v′i, v−i)), for all i ∈ N , any alternative
report v′i ∈ V of buyer i and any vector of reports v−i of all the other buyers.
Requiring incentive compatibility from a mechanism can lead to worse revenue, so our
goal will be to design mechanisms that achieve revenue close to that attained in the pure
optimization problem (of finding a revenue optimal envy-free pricing without incentive
constraints).
Types of Buyers. The next definitions will be used extensively in the paper. Buyer i is
said to be hungry at price p if vi > p and semi-hungry if vi = p. Given an allocation x and a
price p buyer i is essentially hungry if it is either semi-hungry with xi = min{bBi/pc,m} or
hungry. In other words, a buyer is essentially hungry if its value per unit is at least as high
as the price per unit and, moreover, the buyer receives the largest non-zero element in its
demand set.
3 An optimal envy-free and truthful mechanism
In this section, we present our main contribution, an envy-free and truthful mechanism,
which is optimal among all truthful mechanisms and achieves small constant approximations
to the optimal welfare and revenue. The approximation guarantees are with respect to the
market-share s∗, which intuitively captures the maximum purchasing power of any individual
buyer in the auction. The formal definition is postponed to the corresponding subsection.
2 In principle the spaces V and O can be the same but for the purpose of getting good revenue and
welfare, it is useful to have the price to be drawn from a slightly larger domain; see Section 3.
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of the optimal revenue, and
1− s∗ of the optimal welfare
on any market. This mechanism is optimal for both the revenue and welfare objectives
when the market is even mildly competitive (i.e. with market share s∗ ≤ 50%), and its
approximation for welfare converges to 1 as the auction becomes fully competitive.
Consider the following mechanism.
All-or-Nothing:
Given as input the valuations of the buyers, let p be the minimum envy-free price
and x the allocation obtained as follows:
For every hungry buyer i, set xi to its demand.
For every buyer i with vi < p, set xi = 0.
For every semi-hungry buyer i, set xi = bBi/pc if possible, otherwise set xi = 0
taking the semi-hungry buyers in lexicographic order.
In other words, the mechanism always outputs the minimum envy-free price but if there are
semi-hungry buyers at that price, they get either all the units they can afford at this price or
0, even if there are still available units, after satisfying the demands of the hungry buyers.
I Lemma 7. The minimum envy-free price does not exist when the price domain is R.
Proof. If the price can be any real number, consider an auction with n = 2 buyers, m = 2
units, valuations v1 = v2 = 3 and budgets B1 = B2 = 2. At any price p ≤ 1, there is
overdemand since each buyer is hungry and demands at least 2 units, while there are only 2
units in total. At any price p ∈ (1, 2], each buyer demands at most one unit due to budget
constraints, and so all the prices in the range (1, 2] are envy-free. This is an open set, and
so there is no minimum envy-free price. Note however, that by making the output domain
discrete, e.g. with 0.1 increments starting from zero, then the minimum envy-free price
output is 1.01. At this price each buyer purchases 1 unit. J
Given the example above, we will consider the discrete domain V as an infinite grid with
entries of the form k · ε, for k ∈ N and some sufficiently small3 ε. For the output of the
mechanism, we will assume a slightly finer grid, e.g. with entries k · δ = k(ε/2), for k ∈ N.
The minimum envy-free price can be found in time which is polynomial in the input and
log(1/ε), using binary search4 and the mechanism is optimal with respect to discrete domain
that we operate on. Operating on a grid is actually without loss of generality in terms of the
objectives; even if we compare to the optimal on the continuous domain, if our discretization
is fine enough, we don’t lose any revenue or welfare. This is established by the following
theorem; the proof is omitted due to lack of space (see full version).
3 For most of our results, any discrete domain is sufficient for the results to hold; for some results we will
need to a number of grid points that polynomial in the size of the input grid.
4 In the full version, we describe a faster procedure that finds the minimum envy-free without requiring
to do binary search over the grid.
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I Theorem 8. When the valuation and budget of each buyer are drawn from a discrete
grid with entries k · ε, and the price is is drawn from a finer grid with entries k · ε/2, for
k ∈ N, then the welfare and revenue loss of the All-or-Nothing mechanism due to the
discretization of the output domain is zero. The mechanism always runs in time polynomial
in the input and log(1/ε).
Truthfulness of the All-or-Nothing Mechanism
The following theorem establishes the truthfulness of All-or-Nothing.
I Theorem 9. The All-or-Nothing mechanism is truthful.
Proof. First, we will prove the following statement. If p is any envy-free price and p′ is an
envy-free price such that p ≤ p′ then the utility of any essentially hungry buyer i at price p
is at least as large as its utility at price p′. The case when p′ = p is trivial, since the price
(and the allocation) do not change. Consider the case when p < p′. Since p is an envy-free
price, buyer i receives the maximum number of items in its demand. For a higher price p′,
its demand will be at most as large as its demand at price p and hence its utility at p′ will
be at most as large as its utility at p.
Assume now for contradiction that Mechanism All-or-Nothing is not truthful and let
i be a deviating buyer who benefits by misreporting its valuation vi as v′i at some valuation
profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), for which the minimum envy-free price is p. Let p′ be the new
minimum envy free price and let x and x′ be the corresponding allocations at p and p′
respectively, according to All-or-Nothing. Let v′ = (v′i, v−i) be the valuation profile after
the deviation.
We start by arguing that the deviating buyer i is essentially hungry. First, assume for
contradiction that i is neither hungry nor semi-hungry, which means that vi < p. Clearly, if
p′ ≥ p, then buyer i does not receive any units at p′ and there is no incentive for manipulation;
thus we must have that p′ < p. This implies that every buyer j such that xj > 0 at price p is
hungry at price p′ and hence x′j ≥ xj . Since the demand of all players does not decrease at
p′, this implies that p′ is also an envy-free price on instance v, contradicting minimality of p.
Next, assume that buyer i is semi-hungry but not essentially hungry, which means that
vi = p and xi = 0, by the allocation of the mechanism. Again, in order for the buyer to
benefit, it has to hold that p′ < p and x′i > 0 which implies that x′i = bBi/p′ c, i.e. buyer
i receives the largest element in its demand set at price p′. But then, since p′ < p and p′
is an envy-free price, buyer i could receive bBi/pc units at price p without violating the
envy-freeness of p, in contradiction with each buyer i being essentially hungry at p.
From the previous two paragraphs, the deviating buyer must be essentially hungry. This
means that xi > 0 and vi ≥ p. By the discussion in the first paragraph of the proof, we have
p′ < p. Since xi > 0, the buyer does not benefit from reporting v′i such that v′i < p′. Thus it
suffices to consider the case when v′i ≥ p′. We have two subcases:
v′i > p: Buyer i is essentially hungry at price p according to vi and hungry at price
p′ according to v′i. The reports of the other buyers are fixed and Bi is known; simil-
arly to above, price p′ is an envy-free price on instance v, contradicting the minimality of p.
v′i = p′: Intuitively, an essentially hungry buyer at price p is misreporting its valuation as
being lower trying to achieve an envy-free price p′ equal to the reported valuation. Since
v′i = p′, Mechanism All-or-Nothing gives the buyer either as many units as it can
afford at this price or zero units. In the first case, since p′ is envy-free and Bi is known,
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buyer i at price p′ receives the largest element in its demand set and since the valuations
of all other buyers are fixed, p′ is also an envy-free price on input v, contradicting the
minimality of p. In the second case, the buyer does not receive any units and hence it
does not benefit from misreporting.
Thus there are no improving deviations, which concludes the proof of the theorem. J
Performance of the All-or-Nothing Mechanism
Next, we show that the mechanism has a good performance for both objectives. We measure





where OBJ ∈ {SW,REV} is either the social welfare or the revenue objective. Obviously, a
mechanism that outputs a pair that maximizes the objectives has approximation ratio 1. The
goal is to construct truthful mechanisms with approximation ratio as close to 1 as possible.
We remark here that for the approximation ratios, we only need to consider valuation
profiles that are not “trivial”, i.e. input profiles for which at any envy-free price, no hungry
or semi-hungry buyers can afford a single unit and hence the envy-free price can be anything;
on trivial profiles, both the optimal price and allocation and the price and allocation output
by Mechanism All-or-Nothing obtain zero social welfare or zero revenue.
Market Share. A well-known notion for measuring the competitiveness of a market is the
market share, understood as the percentage of the market accounted for by a specific entity
(see, e.g., [21], Chapter 2).
In our model, the maximum purchasing power (i.e. number of units) of any buyer in
the auction occurs at the minimum envy-free price, pmin. By the definition of the demand,
there are many ways of allocating the semi-hungry buyers, so when measuring the purchasing
power of an individual buyer we consider the maximum number of units that buyer can
receive, taken over the set of all feasible maximal allocations at pmin. Let this set be X .








Then, the market share is defined as s∗ = maxni=1 si. Roughly speaking, a market share
s∗ ≤ 1/2 means that a buyer can never purchase more than half of the resources.
I Theorem 10. The All-or-Nothing mechanism approximates the optimal revenue within
a factor of 2 whenever the market share, s∗, is at most 50%.
Proof. Let OPT be the optimal revenue, attained at some price p∗ and allocation x, and
REV(AON) the revenue attained by the All-or-Nothing mechanism. By definition,
mechanism All-or-Nothing outputs the minimum envy-free price pmin, together with an
allocation z. For ease of exposition, let αi = Bi/pmin and α∗i = Bi/p∗, ∀i ∈ N . There are
two cases, depending on whether the optimal envy-free price, p∗, is equal to the minimum
envy-free price, pmin:
Case 1: p∗ > pmin. Denote by L the set of buyers with valuations at least p∗ that can afford
at least one unit at the optimal price. Note that the set of buyers that get allocated
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at pmin is a superset of L. Moreover, the optimal revenue is bounded by the revenue
attained at the (possibly infeasible) allocation where all the buyers in L get the maximum




bαic · pmin and OPT ≤
∑
i∈L
bα∗i c · p∗.





i∈L bαic · pmin∑
i∈L bα∗i c · p∗
≥
∑

















where we used that the auction is non-trivial, i.e. for any buyer i ∈ L, bαic ≥ 1, and so
αi ≤ bαic+ 1 ≤ 2 bαic.
Case 2: p∗ = pmin. The hungry buyers at pmin, as well as the buyers with valuations below
pmin, receive identical allocations under All-or-Nothing and the optimal allocation,
x. However there are multiple ways of assigning the semi-hungry buyers to achieve an
optimal allocation. Recall that z is the allocation made by All-or-Nothing. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that x is an optimal allocation with the property that x
is a superset of z and the following condition holds:
the number of buyers not allocated under z, but that are allocated under x, is minimized.
We argue that x allocates at most one buyer more compared to z. Assume by contradiction
that there are at least two semi-hungry buyers i and j, such that 0 < xi < bαic and
0 < xj < bαjc. Then we can progressively take units from buyer j and transfer them
to buyer i, until either buyer i receives x′i = bαic, or buyer j receives x′j = 0. Hence
we can assume that the set of semi-hungry buyers that receive non-zero, non-maximal
allocations in the optimal solution x is either empty or a singleton. If the set is empty,
then All-or-Nothing is optimal. Otherwise, let the singleton be `; denote by x̃` the
maximum number of units that ` can receive in any envy-free allocation at pmin. Since
the number of units allocated by any maximal envy-free allocation at pmin is equal to∑n









= OPT − x` · pmin
OPT
≥ OPT − x̃` · pmin
OPT
= 1− x̃` · pmin∑n
i=1 xi · pmin
= 1− x̃`∑n
i=1 xi
= 1− s∗i ≥ 1− s∗
Combining the two cases, the bound follows. This completes the proof. J
I Corollary 11. The performance of the All-or-Nothing mechanism is max{2, 1/(1− s∗)
on any market (i.e. with market share 0 < s∗ < 1).
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 10, since the arguments of Case 1 do not use the
market share s∗, it follows that the ratio of All-Or-Nothing for the revenue objective can
alternatively be stated as max{2, 1/(1− s∗)} and therefore it degrades gracefully with the
increase in the market share. J
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The next theorem establishes that the approximation ratio for welfare is also constant.
I Theorem 12. The approximation ratio of Mechanism All-or-Nothing with respect to
the social welfare is at most 1/(1−s∗), where the market share s∗ ∈ (0, 1). The approximation
ratio goes to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive.
Proof. For social welfare we have, similarly to Theorem 10, that
SW(AON)
OPT
= OPT − x` · v`
OPT
≥ OPT − x̃` · v`
OPT
= 1− x̃` · v`∑n
i=1 xi · vi
≥ 1− x̃` · v`∑n
i=1 xi · v`
= 1− x̃`∑n
i=1 xi
= 1− s∗i ≥ 1− s∗,
where OPT is now the optimal welfare, x the corresponding allocation at OPT , and we used
the fact that v` ≤ vi for all i ∈ L. J
Finally, All-or-Nothing is optimal among all truthful mechanisms for both objectives
whenever the market share s∗ is at most 1/2.
I Theorem 13. Let M be any truthful mechanism that always outputs an envy-free pricing
scheme. Then the approximation ratio of M for the revenue and the welfare objective is at
least 2− 4m+2 .
Proof. Consider an auction with equal budgets, B, and valuation profile v. Assume that
buyer 1 has the highest valuation, v1, buyer 2 the second highest valuation v2, with the
property that v1 > v2 + ε, where ε is set later. Let vi < v2 for all buyers i = 3, 4, . . . , n. Set
B such that b Bv2 c =
m




2 . Informally, the buyers can afford
m
2 + 1 units at prices v2 and v2 + ε. Note that on this profile, Mechanism All-or-Nothing
outputs price v2 and allocates m2 + 1 units to buyer 1. For a concrete example of such an
auction, take m = 12, v1 = 1.12, v2 = 1.11 (i.e. ε = 0.01) and B = 8 (the example can be
extended to any number of units with appropriate scaling of the parameters).
Let M be any truthful mechanism, pM its price on this instance, and p∗ the optimal
price (with respect to the objective in question). The high level idea of the proof, for both
objectives, is the following. We start from the profile v above, where pmin = v2 is the
minimum envy-free price, and argue that if p∗ 6= v2, then the bound follows. Otherwise,
p∗ = v2, case in which we construct a series of profiles v,v(1),v(2), . . . ,v(k) that only differ
from the previous profile in the sequence by the reported valuation v(j)2 of buyer 2. We argue
that in each such profile, either the mechanism allocates units to buyer 1 only, case in which
the bound is immediate, or buyer 2 is semi-hungry. In the latter case, truthfulness and the
constraints on the number of units will imply that any truthful mechanism must allocate to
buyer 2 zero items, yielding again the required bound.
First, consider the social welfare objective. Observe that for the optimal price p∗ on
profile v, it holds that p∗ = v2. We have a few subcases:
Case 1: pM < v2. Then M is not an envy-free mechanism, since in this case there would be
over-demand for units.
Case 2: pM > v2: Then M allocates units only to buyer 1, achieving a social welfare of at
most (m2 + 1)v2. The maximum social welfare is m · v2, so the approximation ratio of M
is at least m(m/2)+1 = 2−
4
m+2 .
Case 3: pM = v2: Let x2 be the number of units allocated to buyer 2 at price v2; note that
since buyer 2 is semi-hungry at v2, any number of units up to m2 − 1 is a valid allocation.
If x2 = 0, then M allocates units only to buyer 1 at price v2 and for the same reason as
in Case 2, the ratio is greater than or equal to 2− 4m+2 ; so we can assume x2 ≥ 1.
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Next, consider valuation profile v(1) where for each buyer i 6= 2, we have v(1)i = vi, while
for buyer 2, v2 < v(1)2 < v2 + ε. By definition of B, the minimum envy-free price on
v(1) is v(1)2 . Let p
(1)
M be the price output by M on valuation profile v(1) and take a few
subcases:
(a) p(1)M > v
(1)
2 : Then using the same argument as in Case 2, the approximation is at
least 2− 4m+2 .
(b) p(1)M < v
(1)




(c) p(1)M = v
(1)
2 : Let x
(1)
2 be the number of units allocated to buyer 2 at profile v(1); we
claim that x(1)2 ≥ 2. Otherwise, if x
(1)
2 ≤ 1, then on profile v(1) buyer 2 would have
an incentive to report v2, which would move the price to v2, giving buyer 2 at least
as many units (at a lower price), contradicting truthfulness.
Consider now a valuation profile v(2), where for each buyer i 6= 2, it holds that v(2)i =
v
(1)




2 < v2 + ε. For the same reasons as in
Cases a-c, the behavior of M must be such that:
the price output on input v(2) is v(2)2 (otherwise M only allocates to buyer 1, and the
bound is immediate), and
the number of units x(2)2 allocated to buyer 2 is at least 3 (otherwise truthfulness would
be violated).
By iterating through all the profiles in the sequence constructed in this manner, we arrive
at a valuation profile v(k) (similarly constructed), where the price is v(k)2 and buyer 2
receives at least m/2 units. However, buyer 1 is still hungry at price v(k)2 and should
receive at least m2 + 1 units, which violates the unit supply constraint. This implies that
in the first profile, v, M must allocate 0 units to buyer 2 (by setting the price to v2
or to something higher where buyer 2 does not want any units). This implies that the
approximation ratio is at least 2− 4m+2 .
For the revenue objective, the argument is exactly the same, but we need to establish that at
any profile v or v(i), i = 1, . . . , k that we construct, the optimal envy-free price is equal to
the second highest reported valuation, i.e. v2 or v(i)2 , i = 1, . . . , k respectively. To do that,




any hungry buyer at price v2 + δ buys the same number of units as it would buy at price v2.
Furthermore, ε and δ can be chosen small enough such that (m2 + 1)(v2 + δ) < m · v2, i.e.
the revenue obtained by selling m2 + 1 units to buyer 1 at price v2 + δ is smaller than the
revenue obtained by selling m2 + 1 units to buyer 1 and
m
2 − ε units to buyer 2 at price v2.
This establishes the optimal envy-free price is the same as before, for every profile in the
sequence and all arguments go through.
Given that we are working over a discrete domain, for the proof to go through, it suffices
to assume that there are m points of the domain between v1 and v2, which is easily the case
if the domain is not too sparse. Specifically, for the concrete example presented at the first
paragraph of the proof, assuming that the domain contains all the decimal floating point
numbers with up to two decimal places suffices. J
4 Impossibility Results
In this section, we state our impossibility results, which imply that truthfulness can only be
guaranteed when there is some kind of wastefulness; a similar observation was made in [6]
for a different setting.
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I Theorem 14. There is no Pareto efficient, truthful mechanism that always outputs an
envy-free pricing, even when the budgets are known.
The proof of the theorem is left for the full version. The next theorem provides a stronger
impossibility result. First, we provide the necessary definitions. A buyer i on profile input v is
called irrelevant if at the minimum envy-free price p on v, the buyer can not buy even a single
unit. A mechanism is called in-range if it always outputs an envy-free price in the interval
[0, vj ] where vj is the highest valuation among all buyers that are not irrelevant. Finally, a
mechanism is non-wasteful if at a given price p, the mechanism allocates as many items as
possible to the buyers. Note that Pareto efficiency implies in-range and non-wastefulness, but
not the other way around. In a sense, while Pareto efficiency also determines the price chosen
by the mechanism, non-wastefulness only concerns the allocation given a price, whereas
in-range only restricts prices to a “reasonable” interval.
I Theorem 15. There is no in-range, non-wasteful and truthful mechanism that always
outputs an envy-free pricing scheme, even when the budgets are known.
We leave the proof for the full version. To prove the impossibility, we first obtain a necessary
condition; any mechanism in this class must essentially output the minimum envy-free price
(or the next highest price on the output grid). Then we can use this result to construct
and example where the mechanism must leave some items unallocated in order to satisfy
truthfulness.
5 Discussion
Our results show that it is possible to achieve good approximate truthful mechanisms, under
reasonable assumptions on the competitiveness of the auctions which retain some of the
attractive properties of the Walrasian equilibrium solutions. The same agenda could be
applied to more general auctions, beyond the case of linear valuations or even beyond multi-
unit auctions. It would be interesting to obtain a complete characterization of truthfulness
in the case of private or known budgets; for the case of private budgets, we can show that a
class of order statistic mechanisms are truthful, but the welfare or revenue guarantees for
this case may be poor. Finally, in the full version, we present an interesting special case,
that of monotone auctions, in which Mechanism All-Or-Nothing is optimal among all
truthful mechanisms for both objectives, regardless of the market share.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank the MFCS reviewers for useful feedback.
References
1 E. Anderson and D. Simester. Price stickiness and customer antagonism. Available at
SSRN 1273647, 2008.
2 L. M. Ausubel. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. The American
Economic Review, 94(5):1452–1475, 2004.
3 M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, N. Nisan, and R. Paes Leme. On the efficiency of the walrasian
mechanism. In ACM EC, pages 783–800. ACM, 2014.
4 M. F. Balcan, A. Blum, and Y. Mansour. Item pricing for revenue maximization. In ACM
EC, pages 50–59. ACM, 2008.
5 Y. Bartal, R. Gonen, and N. Nisan. Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions.
In TARK, pages 72–87, 2003.
S. Brânzei, A. Filos-Ratsikas, P. B. Miltersen, and Y. Zeng 80:13
6 C. Borgs, J. Chayes, N. Immorlica, M. Mahdian, and A. Saberi. Multi-unit auctions with
budget-constrained bidders. In ACM EC, pages 44–51, 2005.
7 A. Borodin, O. Lev, and T. Strangway. Budgetary effects on pricing equilibrium in online
markets. In AAMAS, 2016.
8 S. Brânzei, Y. Chen, X. Deng, A. Filos-Ratsikas, S. K. S. Frederiksen, and J. Zhang. The
fisher market game: Equilibrium and welfare. In AAAI, pages 587–593, 2014.
9 Simina Brânzei and Ariel D. Procaccia. Verifiably truthful mechanisms. In ITCS, pages
297–306, 2015.
10 Y. Cai, C. Daskalakis, and M. Weinberg. Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design:
Reducing revenue to welfare maximization. In FOCS, pages 130–139, 2012.
11 Y. Cai, C. Daskalakis, and M. Weinberg. Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Ap-
proximation algorithms and other generalizations. In SODA, pages 578–595, 2013.
12 N. Chen, X. Deng, and J. Zhang. How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market? In
ESA, pages 106–118. Springer, 2011.
13 M. Cheung and C. Swamy. Approximation algorithms for single-minded envy-free profit-
maximization problems with limited supply. In FOCS, pages 35–44, 2008.
14 V. Cohen-Addad, A. Eden, M. Feldman, and A. Fiat. The invisible hand of dynamic market
pricing. In ACM EC, pages 383–400, 2016.
15 R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Leonardi, P. Sankowski, and Q. Zhang. Revenue maximizing envy-
free fixed-price auctions with budgets. In WINE, pages 233–246. Springer, 2014.
16 S. Dobzinski, R. Lavi, and N. Nisan. Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. GEB,
74(2):486–503, 2012.
17 S. Dobzinski and R. P. Leme. Efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets. In ICALP,
pages 392–404. Springer, 2014.
18 S. Dobzinski and N. Nisan. Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. In ACM EC, pages 346–351,
2007.
19 S. Dobzinski and N. Nisan. Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts. JET, 156:14–44, 2015.
20 A. Eden, M. Feldman, O. Friedler, I. Talgam-Cohen, and M. Weinberg. The competition
complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders. In ACM
EC, 2017.
21 P. Farris, N. Bendle, P. Pfeifer, and D. Reibstein. Marketing metrics: The definitive guide
to measuring marketing performance. Pearson Education, 2010.
22 M. Feldman, A. Fiat, S. Leonardi, and P. Sankowski. Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-
unit auctions with budgets. In ACM EC, pages 532–549, 2012.
23 M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. Combinatorial auctions via posted prices. In SODA,
pages 123–135, 2015.
24 F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 87(1):95–124, 1999.
25 V. Guruswami, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, D. Kempe, C. Kenyon, and F. McSherry. On profit-
maximizing envy-free pricing. In SODA, pages 1164–1173, 2005.
26 Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan. The menu-size complexity of auctions. In ACM EC, pages
565–566, 2013.
27 J. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In ACM EC, pages
225–234. ACM, 2009.
28 J. Hartline and Q. Yan. Envy, truth, and profit. In ACM EC, pages 243–252, 2011.
29 J. D. Hartline. Mechanism design and approximation. Book draft. October, 122, 2013.
30 A. S. Kelso and V. P. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes.
Econometrica, 50:1483–1504, 1982.
31 Shengwu Li. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms, 2015. Working paper.
MFCS 2017
80:14 Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions
32 E. Markakis and O. Telelis. Envy-free revenue approximation for asymmetric buyers with
budgets. In SAGT, pages 247–259, 2016.
33 R. Mehta and M. Sohoni. Exchange markets: Strategy meets supply-awareness. In WINE,
pages 361–362. Springer, 2013.
34 R. Mehta, N. Thain, L. Végh, and A. Vetta. To save or not to save: The fisher game. In
WINE, pages 294–307. Springer, 2014.
35 R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. MOR, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
36 N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, (editors) 2007.
37 M. Petersen. Information: Hard and soft, 7 2004.
38 Shreyas Sekar. Posted pricing sans discrimination. In IJCAI, to appear, 2017.
39 L. Walras. Elements d’economie politique pure, ou theorie de la richesse sociale (in french),
1874. English translation: Elements of pure economics; or, the theory of social wealth.
American Economic Association and the Royal Economic Society, 1954.
